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III. ARGUMENT 
A. The State's Assertion that Appellant did not Marshal the 
Evidence is Both Without Merit and not Properly Before the 
Court. 
1. Appellant's Recitation of Facts Fairly and Accurately 
sets Forth All Facts upon Which the Jury Could Have Based 
its Decision. 
The claim that Appellant did not marshal the evidence is 
incorrect. The State claims Appellant failed to explain that 
"defendant's arrangement with Tim Markham was month-to-month 
. . . ." Br. Appellee, at 14. Appellant specifically set forth 
that fact in footnote 1 of his initial Brief. The State next 
contends Appellant did not include the fact that, "defendant paid 
no rent for December 1995 or January 1998." Id. However, as the 
State notes earlier in its Brief, "Defendant did not pay . . . and 
does not claim to have paid, for the months of December 1995 or 
January 1996." Br. Appellee, at 10 (emphasis supplied). The State 
claims Appellant ignored the fact that Mr. Hawkins, "just 
disappeared for two or three months . . . " Br. Appellee, at 14. 
Appellant clearly stated, "[Mr. Hawkins] seemed to disappear near 
the end of October." Br. Appellant, at 9. The State asserts 
Appellant ignored an exchange between Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Severns 
stating: "at the time, defendant asked Severns what he was doing 
there, a question that Severns found unusual." Br. Appellee, 
at 15- Appellant specifically referenced this same exchange: 
uMr. Hawkins asked Mr. Severns what he was doing there, and 
Mr. Severns asked the same of Mr. Hawkins." Br. Appellant, at 10. 
Finally, the State argued Appellant ignored the admission that 
Mr. Hawkins "entered both units and . . . 'did what I had to do.'" 
Br. Appellee, at 15. Again, it is the State that recognizes, 
"Defendant admits he entered the units around 4 a.m." 
Br. Appellee, at 20 (citing Br. Appellant, at 32) . Thus, the 
State's contention that Appellant ignored or overlooked these facts 
is an unfair characterization. 
The remaining four facts the State claims were ignored are 
either irrelevant or false. For example, the State cites a 
discussion between Gloria Markham and Jack Carlton where 
Mr. Carlton said he might know who took the Markhams' tools. Br. 
Appellee, at 15. This evidence could support a finding that Mr. 
Hawkins entered the units and that he committed the theft. Of 
course, Mr. Hawkins admits to entering the property, see, 
Br. Appellee, at 20, and theft is not an issue on appeal.1 
Accordingly, Mr. Carlton's thoughts about whom he suspected in the 
'Although Mr. Hawkins denied having stolen any property, he 
chose not to appeal the conviction for theft because there was some 
evidence supporting that Count. 
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theft is irrelevant. The State also cites Mr. Markham's comment 
that Mr. Hawkins "evicted himself by not showing." Br. Appellant, 
at 14. That comment is a legal conclusion and an incorrect legal 
conclusion, and what Mr. Markham considered to be the state of the 
law at the time of the trial is irrelevant. The State also notes 
that after the theft occurred, Mr. Hawkins lied to the inves-
tigating officer. That assertion has no bearing on whether 
Mr. Hawkins committed an unlawful entry. 
Finally, the State's claim that Mr. Markham changed all the 
locks is untrue. A cursory review of the facts set forth in the 
State's Brief shows that Mr. Markham did not change either lock on 
Unit 98. Each Unit had an outside and an overhead door. 
Tr. Vol. 1, at 101, 195. The State notes that Tim Markham was 
unable to change the lock securing the side door to Unit 98. 
Br. Appellee, at fn. 5. The State also note's, u [b] ecause some 
rollers were missing from the overhead door of unit 98, Tim Markham 
used vise grips to lock the door from the inside." Br. Appellee, 
at 4. The State's own version of the facts establishes that 
condition existed on the night in question. Tr., Vol. 1, at 
147-78. The State's own recitation of the facts shows that 
Mr. Markham did not change the lock on the side door and did not 
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change the locking system on the overhead door. Therefore, 
Mr. Markham did not change either of the locks on unit 98. The 
suggestion that the exclusion of that "fact" was somehow improper 
is erroneous because the assertion is untrue. 
2. The State's Marshaling Argument is not Properly Before 
the Court. 
The Court should not consider the merits of the State's 
marshaling "argument" because it is not presented properly. Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b) requires the Brief of Appellee to 
conform with Rule 24(a)(9). That Rule requires Appellee to state 
its contentions and the reasons supporting its position. Under 
that Rule, Utah Appellate Courts have consistently refused to 
consider argument when a party fails to offer sufficient analysis 
and authority in support of its position. State v. Wareham. 772 
P.2d 960, (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988); State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, n.l (Utah App. 1996); State v. Streeter, 900 
P.2d 1097, n.3 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 
n.3 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah App. 
1992); State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Cayer, 814 P.2d 604, 613 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Steraer. 808 
P.2d 122, n.2 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Pascoe. 774 P.2d 512, n.l 
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(Utah App. 1989); Cf. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 
P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991) (a party cannot present a laundry list 
of the evidence and leave for the court the burden of determining 
what facts are relevant to satisfy its burden to marshal) (citing, 
Heinecke v. Dept. Of Commerce, 810 P. 2d 459 (Utah App. 1991)). The 
driving force behind the rule is that n [a] reviewing court is 
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450. 
Here, the State's two conclusions and a list of ten citations 
to the record do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(b) because 
they leave the burden of argument with the Court. The State's 
^argument" that Appellant did not marshal literally consists of 1) 
a statement that Appellant did not marshal, 2) a list of ten things 
it claims Appellant did not cite in his brief, and 3) a recitation 
that Appellant did not marshal. Br. Appellee, at 14-15. There is 
no argument. The State does not explain why or even whether those 
portions of the record could have been remotely important or 
whether the jury could have based its conclusion on those facts. 
In sum, the claim that Appellant failed to marshal is not supported 
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by any legal reasoning or analysis and, therefore, does not conform 
with Rule 24(b). 
B. The Markhams did not Terminate Mr. Hawkins' Leasehold 
Interest. 
At trial, and now on appeal, the State failed to offer facts 
which would have been legally necessary in order to reach a 
conclusion that Mr. Hawkins' leasehold interest had terminated 
prior to when the alleged crime occurred. Moreover, the Markhams 
acted in a manner that was inconsistent with the suggestion that 
they intended to terminate the Lease. 
1. The Facts as Alleged by the State do not Support a Legal 
Conclusion that the Markhams Terminated Mr. Hawkins' 
Lease. 
The facts elicited at trial are legally insufficient to show 
the Markhams terminated Mr. Hawkins' Lease. Once a person is 
granted permission to enter a property, an unlawful entry can occur 
only if that permission is revoked. People v. Barefield, 804 P.2d 
1342, 1345 (Colo. App. 1990) (citing People v. Carstensen, 420 P.2d 
820 (Colo. 1966)) . Mr. Hawkins had a lawful right to enter because 
he had a Lease which was never terminated. The State does not 
argue the Lease granted Mr. Hawkins the license, right and 
privilege to enter. The State argues that at some point prior to 
when the alleged crime took place the Lease had terminated, thereby 
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revoking Mr. Hawkins7 license to enter. This argument fails 
because the Markhams' acts and omissions were insufficient as a 
matter of law to terminate the Lease. 
The facts the State cites in support of its argument do not 
support its conclusion. First, the State's reliance on 
Mr. Hawkins' actions are misplaced. The State supports its 
argument with the facts that Mr. Hawkins 1) did not pay rent 2) was 
not forthright with the police when confronted, 3) did not claim 
his right to enter was based on the Lease when questioned by the 
police, and (4) did not claim his right to enter was based on the 
Lease when he testified at trial. Br. Appellee, at 15-16. Each of 
these facts is irrelevant. Only the Markhams had the authority to 
exclude Mr. Hawkins from the property. What Mr. Hawkins did, or 
did not do, as a matter of law, could not infringe upon the 
Markhams' exclusive right to control their property. Thus, 
reliance on Mr. Hawkins' actions is inappropriate. Furthermore, 
the existence of the Lease depends exclusively on the events which 
occurred before the entry. What happened after the fact is 
irrelevant. 
The only other facts the State cites in support of its 
position are, 1) Mr. Markham changed the locks and re-rented the 
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space, and 2) the Lease automatically expired when Mr. Hawkins 
"disappeared." Id. Reliance on these ufacts" is improper because 
they do not exist as evidence in this case. First, Mr. Markham did 
not change the locks as the State claims. See, section III(A)(1), 
supra. Second, it does not follow from the record that the Lease 
automatically terminated. The terms of the Lease agreement were, 
"you pay you stay. You don't you go." Tr., Vol. 1, at 136, 169. 
The record is clear that Mr. Hawkins was never timely with his 
rent. According to Mr. Markham, Mr. Hawkins paid, "a little bit 
here and there, you know." Tr., Vol. 1, at 157. "[Mr. Hawkins] 
was supposed to be renting [unit 98], but you know, whether I got 
it or whether I didn't get it; I would chase him around until the 
15th or 20th of the month trying to get money out of him, you know." 
When asked if Mr. Hawkins made the rent payment as agreed, 
Mr. Markham responded, " [a] s far as I know he made a couple." 
Tr., Vol. 1, at 16 9. Mr. Hawkins was chronically late with his 
rent, if he made it at all. The record does not suggest anyone 
considered the "you pay you stay" Lease terminated simply because 
Mr. Hawkins was untimely with rent. Accordingly, the State's 
conclusion that Mr. Hawkins' late rent automatically terminated the 
Lease is not reasonably based in the evidence. 
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In this case, the record shows the Markhams did not evict 
Mr. Hawkins or inform him in any way that he was unwelcome. 
Br. Appellee, at 17. The record also shows the Markhams did not 
retake the property, remove Mr. Hawkins' belongings from the units 
or take any other action to put Mr. Hawkins on notice his Lease was 
terminated. In short, the record offers no support to the State's 
claim that the Markhams terminated the Lease agreement they had 
with Mr. Hawkins. 
2. Markhams Elected to Leave Mr. Hawkins in Possession of 
the Property Rather than Terminate the Lease. 
Contrary to what the State suggests, the Markhams did not 
terminate Mr. Hawkins leasehold interest. Instead, at worst for 
Mr. Hawkins, the Markhams treated the Lease as modified to a 
storage arrangement so they could charge Mr. Hawkins storage fees. 
Between November 1, 1995 and at least January 29, 1996, the 
Markhams charged Mr. Hawkins rent for the use of the units to store 
Mr. Hawkins' property. State's Exhibit 8. On January 29, 1996, 
Gloria Markham wrote Mr. Hawkins a letter explaining that she was 
charging Mr. Hawkins a storage fee of $16.00 per day for storing 
his belongings in the units. Id. Those charges began accruing on 
November 1, 1995, and were to continue until such time as 
Mr. Hawkins or Mr. Carlton removed Mr. Hawkins' remaining 
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possessions. As of January 29, 1996, Mr. Hawkins had a storage 
bill of $1,440.00. That sum includes a $16.00 fee for the date the 
alleged crimes occurred. 
The Markhams were faced with a decision when Mr. Hawkins did 
not pay rent for December 1995 and January 1996: evict Mr. Hawkins 
from the property and lose the right to collect rent or, let 
Mr. Hawkins store his property in the units and charge him a 
storage fee. They unequivocally chose the later. The benefit the 
Markhams wanted was $16.00 a day for rent. The burden they accepted 
was to grant Mr. Hawkins the license to access his property. 
Simply because the Markhams became unhappy with their bargain is 
not sufficient justification to ignore the legal consequence of 
their choice. 
By treating the Lease as one for storage the Markhams did not 
divest Mr. Hawkins of his license to enter. At best, the election 
changed the nature of the agreement from one where Mr. Hawkins used 
the shops to perform auto-body repair to one where Mr. Hawkins used 
the space to store and access his belongings for a lesser fee. By 
changing the nature of the Lease, Mr. Hawkins still had a lawful 
right to access his property which was stored in the units, and, as 
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noted above, the license and privilege to enter were never 
otherwise terminated. 
C. The Markhams did not Restrict the Scope of Mr. Hawkins' 
License to Enter as the State now Contends. 
The State does not contest the Markhams' invitations gave 
Mr. Hawkins a lawful right to enter units 98 and 99. Rather, the 
State argues Mr. Hawkins' entry was unlawful because his entry 
somehow exceeded the scope of his license to enter. According to 
the State, when the Markhams told Mr. Hawkins to xx [c] ome get your 
shit," the Markhams xxintended" and Mr. Hawkins "understood" that 
Mr. Hawkins could return to the complex only during xxnormal 
business hours" and under the Markhams supervision. Br. Appellee, 
at 17. There are no facts upon which such inferences could have 
arisen. 
The State's reasoning is based on the false premise that the 
record supports a finding that any restrictions ever existed. In 
order to sustain a burglary conviction on the theory that the 
accused committed an unlawful entry by exceeding the scope of his 
license or privilege to enter, the State must affirmatively prove 
the scope of the license and how it was exceeded. State v. Harper, 
785 P.2d 1341 (Kan. 1990), People v. Rider, 307 N.W.2d 690 (Mich. 
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1981), People v. Woolsey, 322 N.E.2d 614 (111 1975), State v. 
Starkweather, 297 P. 497 (Mont. 1931). 
In Woolsey, for example, the defendant was charged with 
committing a burglary of the warehouse were he worked. Woolsey. 
322 N.E. 2d, at 614. Defendant argued he could not have committed 
an unlawful entry because he was an employee with a key to the 
warehouse and, therefore, had license and privilege to enter. Id. 
at 615. In support of its case the State showed that employees 
were authorized to enter the warehouse only during business hours 
as defined by the company. Id. at 615. The only exception to that 
rule was if an employee worked past closing time, he could enter 
the warehouse to return a vehicle or materials. On the day of the 
alleged crime, all employees were required to return to the 
warehouse early because of bad weather. Accordingly, no one would 
have been working past closing. The warehouse later closed at 5:00 
p.m. and no employees would have had reason or authority to enter 
the warehouse until the next day. Thereafter, the defendant 
entered the warehouse and committed a theft. The Court affirmed 
the conviction, holding that "the evidence in the instant case does 
support the conclusion that defendant's authority to enter the 
Gersman and Company building was limited to those occasions -- both 
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time and purpose -- where necessary to further the employee's 
activities." Id. at 617. There is no analogous showing in this 
case; the employee was not leasing space in the warehouse or 
storing his property there for a fee and Mr. Hawkins was not an 
employee of the Markhams nor subject to their supervision. 
In this case, the State's argument that Mr. Hawkins' entry 
exceeded the scope of the permission fails for two reasons. First, 
the State failed to offer sufficient evidence establishing that any 
limitations were placed on Mr. Hawkins' entry. Second, even if 
these limitations existed, the State failed to offer any evidence 
defining the scope of the limitations. 
The State apparently argues Mr. Hawkins' license to enter the 
complex was limited to "business hours" when the Markhams were 
present. Br. Appellee, at 17. However, the record contains no 
evidence those restrictions exist. Certainly no one told 
Mr. Hawkins he could enter only during "business hours," nor did 
anyone tell Mr. Hawkins he could remove his belongings only under 
the Markhams' supervision. Indeed, there is no evidence, stated or 
implied, that the Markhams wanted or even considered such a 
restriction. Examination of the record in this case shows the only 
place where such restrictions are mentioned is in State's brief. 
-13-
Furthermore, even if the State had established Mr. Hawkins was 
allowed to enter only during ''business hours," the State did not 
show, and indeed does not even attempt to show, what "business 
hours" where. If the State now wants to argue its case based on 
the premise that Mr. Hawkins' license was limited to "business 
hours" the State carries the burden to prove when business hours 
were. It did not do so and there is no evidence upon which such a 
showing can be made. The State did not offer any evidence to 
establish when "business hour" were; therefore, it cannot prevail 
on a theory that Mr. Hawkins entered the complex outside of those 
hours. 
The State's suggestion that Mr. Hawkins entered outside 
"business hour" is further undercut by the record showing either 
there were no "business hours" or "business hours" were unlimited. 
Mr. Markham worked in the units "seven days a week if he had to" 
and at times would stay "until after midnight." Tr., Vol. 1, 
at 147. Furthermore, he allowed Mr. Hawkins to "just come and go. 
If he was there, he was there. If he wasn't, he wasn't." 
Tr., Vol. 1, at 13 8. Mr. Markham also testified Mr. Hawkins often 
stayed through the night at the shop. Id. The only reasonable 
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inference is there were no defined "business hours" at the shop, or 
that all hours were "business hours." 
The Markham did not evict Mr. Hawkins, did not tell him he was 
no longer welcome, did not change the locks, and did not remove 
Mr. Hawkins' belongings from the property. The Markhams did, 
however, charge Mr. Hawkins rent for using the units to store his 
property and repeatedly urged and invited Mr. Hawkins to the units 
to remove that property. Assuming Mr. Hawkins removed some of 
Mr. Markhams' property along with his own would make Mr. Hawkins a 
thief, but not a burglar. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, and those set forth in Appellant's Opening 
Brief, the conviction for burglary should be overturned. 
DATED this [7^_ day of April, 1998. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
N:\19209\1\REPLY.BRF 
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